Recontextualizing Mindfulness: Theravada Buddhist Perspectives on the Ethical and Spiritual Dimensions of Awareness. by Lomas, T. & Lomas, T.








Re-contextualising mindfulness:  
Theravada Buddhist perspectives on the ethical and spiritual dimensions of awareness 
 
  
T. Lomas   
Department of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London, E15 4LZ 
e-mail:  t.lomas@uel.ac.uk 
 
 
Note: This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the Mindfulness. It is not 

















Running head: RE-CONTEXTUALISING MINDFULNESS 2 
Abstract  
Although mindfulness has been embraced by the West, this has mostly been a secular ‘de-
contextualised’ form of mindfulness, dis-embedded from its original Buddhist nexus of 
beliefs/practices. This has arguably deprived the practice of its potential to effect more radical 
psychospiritual development. This paper therefore argues for the ‘re-contextualisation’ of 
mindfulness, drawing explicitly on Buddhist philosophy to enhance our appreciation of it, and offers 
a contribution to such re-contextualisation. It presents a novel (in the context of Western 
psychology) theoretical model of mindfulness, drawing on concepts in Theravada Buddhist 
literature. In particular, it suggests that Buddhism identifies three main ‘forms’ of mindfulness: sati 
(awareness of the present moment), appamada (awareness suffused with ethical care), and 
sampajañña (awareness suffused with a sense of spiritual development). Although currently only 
sati has been recognised in the West, we have much to gain from also recognising the potential 
ethical and spiritual dimensions of mindfulness.  
 




















Running head: RE-CONTEXTUALISING MINDFULNESS 3 
Introduction 
Recent years have seen a surge of interest in mindfulness in ‘the West,’ both in academia and 
professional practice, and in society at large. However, while these developments are to be 
welcomed, concerns are beginning to be raised regarding the way in which mindfulness is being 
interpreted and communicated to Western audiences. A key issue is the way mindfulness has been 
largely ‘de-contextualised’ from its antecedent Buddhist roots, taken out of the wider nexus of ideas 
and practices in which it was originally developed (Van Gordon et al., 2015a). Among the scholars 
and practitioners who helped bring mindfulness to the West, there has generally been an attempt to 
convey it in a package that would be amenable to secular Western audiences, shorn of religious or 
esoteric accretions that such audiences might find off-putting, and frequently eschewing explicit 
reference to Buddhism (Shapiro, 1994). This kind of secularisation has mainly occurred through 
mindfulness being operationalised using concepts and discourses taken from academic psychology, 
particularly cognitive theories of attention (Bishop et al., 2004). 
Before discussing why these secularising efforts may be problematic, let us acknowledge 
that they have been (a) necessary and (b) useful. First, without this secularisation, mindfulness 
would arguably not have made the impact in the West it has done (King, 1999). Second, even in its 
decontextualized way, mindfulness has been utilized successfully across diverse academic and 
professional fields, from education (Napoli et al., 2005) to healthcare (Fortney & Taylor, 2010). 
However, while current secularised conceptions of mindfulness are valuable as far as they go, in 
being decontextualized from its Buddhist roots, this current value is nevertheless limited. In its 
original Buddhist context, mindfulness was embedded within a comprehensive system of philosophy 
and practice aimed at personal transformation. Taken out of this context, its potential is arguably 
thus neutered and diminished. This issue has been recognised by Kabat-Zinn himself, despite – or 
perhaps because of – his key role in bringing mindfulness to the West by developing secularised 
modes of delivery, such as his seminal Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MBSR) programme 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1982). While of course still upholding the value of such programmes, he commented 
that ‘the rush to deﬁne mindfulness within Western psychology may wind up denaturing it in 
fundamental ways,’ and as such there is ‘the potential for something priceless to be lost’ (Williams & 
Kabat-Zinn, 2011, p.4).  
Thus, the current paper argues that, now mindfulness has been widely accepted in the West, 
we might benefit from re-contextualising it, i.e., explicitly re-situating it in the context of Buddhist 
theory and practice. Before setting out one way of doing so, it is worth emphasising that there are 
many possible avenues such re-contextualisation might take. Since its origins some 2,500 years ago, 
Buddhism has flowered into a rich and complex body of teachings, encompassing numerous schools 
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of thought, rivalling Christianity (and indeed most main religions) in terms of denominational 
diversity and schismatic complexity. In broad brush strokes, there are three main Buddhist branches: 
Theravāda, Mahāyāna, and Vajrayana. Theravāda (‘Doctrine of the Elders’) is the oldest branch, 
coming into being around the first century B.C.E (Collins, 2005). Its emergence is entwined with the 
formation of the ‘Pāli canon’ (also known as the Tipiṭaka, or ‘three baskets’), in which the Buddha’s 
teachings were preserved in writing (having hitherto only been transmitted orally). This comprises: 
(a) the Vinaya piṭaka (monastic rules); (b) the Sutta piṭaka (discourses/sayings, mostly attributed to 
the Buddha, divided into five Nikāya [volumes], the Dīgha [long], Majjhima [middle-length], 
Samyutta [thematically linked], Anguttara [gradual], and Khuddaka [minor] Nikāya); and (c) the 
Abhidhamma piṭaka (scholastic treatment of the suttas). The Theravāda school was the name given 
to Buddhist communities who closely adhered to the canon (although even then, such communities 
were engaged in selective exegesis and interpretation of these ‘original’ teachings). Mahāyāna is 
used as an overarching label for diverse schools of thought that began to emerge around the first 
century C.E., which started adapting/developing the Buddha’s teachings in new and innovative ways, 
such as the dialectical philosophy of Nāgārjuna (circa 150–250 C.E.) (Walser, 2013). Finally, 
Vajrayana refers to a further efflorescence of philosophical and ritualistic development that 
occurred from the third century C.E. onwards, particularly in Tibet (Davidson, 2003).  
Given such denominational complexities, there are many possible ways of re-contextualising 
mindfulness; as such, the current paper offers but one contribution to, or one aspect of, this kind of 
re-contextualisation. Indeed, we are beginning to see other re-contextualisation efforts, such as 
Kudesia and Nyima (2014), who focus on Tibetan Buddhism. So, in the aim of reflexive openness, the 
current paper is written from a Theravāda perspective, and more specifically, Theravāda as 
interpreted and elucidated by the contemporary English Buddhist teacher Urgyen Sangharakshita 
(2003). (Sangharakshita was ordained within the Therevada tradition in India in 1950, returning to 
the UK to found the Western Buddhist Order in 1967 (renamed in 2010 as the Triratna Buddhist 
Order/Community), now one of the largest Buddhist movements in the UK (Bluck, 2006).) According 
to Sangharakshita’s interpretation of Theravāda, it is possible to identify three different ‘types’ 
mindfulness in the Pāli canon, i.e., three different Pāli words which are all conceptually related to 
awareness: sati (awareness of the present moment), appamada (awareness suffused with an ethos 
of ethical care), and sampajañña (awareness suffused with a sense of spiritual progress). However, 
somewhat by historical accident, only the first of these, sati, has been engaged with by the West, 
and presented as the conceptual root of mindfulness. Consequently, Western conceptualisations of 
mindfulness are to some extent missing the ethical dimension of awareness found in appamada, and 
the spiritual dimension of awareness contained in sampajañña.  
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In order to elucidate the differences between these three types, the paper draws upon a 
teaching that is central to Buddhism, namely paṭiccasamuppāda, i.e., the law of conditionality. 
Essentially, this teaching expresses the Buddha’s insight into the causal nature of the universe, into 
the ordered relationship between conditions and their effects. As expressed by the Buddha (in the 
Cūḷasakuludāyi sutta, as well as elsewhere in the Nikāya; Shulman, 2008): ‘This being, that exists; 
through the arising of this, that arises. This not being, that does not exist; through the ceasing 
of this, that ceases’ (MN [Majjhima Nikāya] 79). Within Buddhist philosophy, this is arguably the 
‘meta’ law that underpins all other laws, such as the second Noble truth (that suffering has a cause) 
(Kang, 2009). Understanding this teaching is thus seen as the key to wellbeing, and ultimately to 
freedom from suffering. As Sangharakshita and Subhuti (2013, p.49) put it, ‘once we have 
understood and are fully convinced about the nature of reality as paṭiccasamuppāda, we align 
ourselves with those regularities or laws that lead us to liberation.’  
This law has been expounded upon in various ways in Buddhist literature. One influential 
analysis – developed by Buddhaghosa in the 5th Century C.E. – is the identification of five different 
‘levels’ of conditionality, known as the fivefold niyāmas. (It should be noted that the Buddha is only 
recorded as discussing the niyāmas individually in the piṭakas (Jones, 2012). The synthesis of the 
niyāmas into a fivefold schema was an act of interpretative exegesis on the part of Buddhaghosa. 
This can be found in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (Sv ii.432), Buddhaghosa’s commentary on the Dīgha 
nikāya, where it occurs in the context of a discussion of the meaning of dhammatā (i.e., order of 
events) in the Mahāpadāna sutta (DA ii.432).) Niyāmas are ‘laws, conditions or constraints that 
govern processes or phenomena’ (Keown, 2003); collectively then, the fivefold niyāmas identify five 
different domains of life that are subject to causal law-like principles.  
First, utu-niyāma is the ‘law of the seasons,’ describing the observable cyclical regularity of 
environmental phenomena (e.g., seasonal patterns). Regarded anachronistically (i.e., in the context 
of contemporary scientific understanding), this is the domain of non-organic physical laws (e.g., the 
law of gravity). Second, bīja-niyāma is the ‘law of seeds,’ describing observable patterns in the realm 
of organic phenomena (e.g., reproductive continuity). Again, regarded anachronistically, this is the 
domain of biochemistry (e.g., genetic inheritance of phenotypes). Third, citta-niyāma is the ‘law of 
the mind,’ describing causal patterns among mental events (e.g., the way thoughts give rise to 
particular feelings). Regarded anachronistically, this is the domain of psychology (e.g., phenomena 
such as classical conditioning). Fourth, kamma-niyāma is the law of ‘karma,’ which describes the way 
actions have consequences (or, in Buddhaghosa’s phraseology, ‘the desirable and undesirable results 
following good and bad action’); this is the domain of ethics and morality. (‘Karma’ is the Sanskrit 
equivalent of the Pāli ‘Kamma.’ Although karma has entered the English language, for consistency 
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this paper will keep to the Pāli version.) Finally, dhamma-niyāma is the ‘law of nature,’ which in this 
context refers to the ‘spiritual potential’ inherent in the universe, such that it is capable of evolving 
complex qualities such as consciousness and exemplary beings like the Buddha. Again, regarded 
anachronistically, we might identify this law with the theory of evolution and, in particular, with 
emergentist philosophies (e.g., Aurobindo, 1939-1940) which view the universe as evolving towards 
complex outcomes such as self-consciousness.  
The relevance here of paṭiccasamuppāda, and of the fivefold niyāmas specifically, is that 
different types of mindfulness might regarded as being attuned to different niyāmas. As set out 
below, sati (i.e., present-moment awareness) might be viewed as focused primarily on the first three 
niyāma (utu, bija, and especially citta). However, it is arguably not until the cultivation of appamada 
that one really becomes cognizant of kamma niyāma, i.e., appreciative of the ethical dimensions of 
one’s actions. Then, it is only through the subsequent emergence of sampajañña that one truly 
develops an understanding of dhamma niyāma, i.e., a conscious and over-riding concern with 
psychospiritual development. As such, we will see that by focusing on sati-type mindfulness alone – 
as the West has hitherto largely done – the more far-reaching, transformative potentials inherent in 
appamada and sampajañña forms of mindfulness are largely missed out on. So, the current paper 
aims to bring these concepts and teachings within the fold of Western psychology, thereby allowing 
such possibilities to be embraced. These ideas will be expounded upon in three sections, discussing 
the three types of mindfulness in turn. Each section will: (a) introduce the type of mindfulness; (b) 
explore it from a Western psychological perspective; (c) examine it from a Buddhist perspective; and 
(d) consider its therapeutic significance. At the end, a concluding section will offer recommendations 
for how the central points of the paper can be harnessed in clinical/therapeutic practice. 
Sati-mindfulness: Awareness of the present moment 
Introducing sati 
We begin by considering sati-mindfulness, since sati is invariably cited by pioneers such as Kabat-
Zinn (2003) as the conceptual origin for their conceptualisations of mindfulness. Indeed, the term 
mindfulness was first coined by the great Buddhist scholar T. W. Rhys Davids as a translation of sati 
(Gethin, 2011). Interestingly, as Gethin notes, Rhys Davids toyed with various terms before settling 
on mindfulness: in Rhys Davids’ 1881 publication of Buddhist suttas, sati was rendered as ‘mental 
activity’ (p.9) and even simply ‘thought’ (p.63), but it was only with Rhys Davids’ 1910 work that he 
settled on the term mindfulness. So, what does sati mean? In Brahmanical India, the word connoted 
‘remembrance’ and ‘recollection,’ though used within a meditative context, this does not refer to 
historical/chronological memory per se, but to a mental state in which one recollects/remembers 
the activity that ‘one is engaged in, in the present moment’ (Peacock, 2014, p.6). As Anālayo (2003, 
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p.48) puts it, sati-mindfulness involves remembering to focus on ‘what is otherwise too easily 
forgotten: the present moment.’  
This is the type of awareness that is described in the Satipaṭṭhāna sutta (the Discourse on 
the establishment of mindfulness; MN 10), regarded as the seminal text in the Pāli Canon on the 
practice of mindfulness (Bodhi, 2011). This teaching includes the instruction: ‘Establishing present-
moment recollection right where you are, simply breathe in, simply aware, then breathe out, simply 
aware.’ This type of present-moment awareness is captured in Kabat-Zinn’s (2003, p.145) influential 
definition of mindfulness – which he stated was based upon sati – as ‘the awareness that arises 
through paying attention on purpose, in the present moment, and nonjudgmentally to the unfolding 
of experience moment by moment.’ Thus, given that most contemporary analyses and applications 
of mindfulness stem directly or indirectly from Kabat-Zinn’s (1982) pioneering operationalization of 
mindfulness, it is fair to say that mindfulness as currently understood and practiced in the West is 
based exclusively on sati-type awareness. It is worth, then, considering what type of awareness is 
being encouraged here.  
Sati from a Western perspective 
One way to appreciate the type of awareness implied by sati would be to analyse sati in terms of 
contemporary psychological constructs pertaining to attention and awareness. For instance, Lutz et 
al. (2008) suggest that meditation practices can be classified into two broad types: focussed 
attention (FA) and open-monitoring (OM). FA practices can be analysed in terms of modular 
attention networks, including sustained attention (focusing on particular qualia, such as the breath), 
executive attention (monitoring distractions from competing stimuli), attention switching 
(disengaging from distractions), and selective attention (redirecting focus back to the meditative 
object). Conversely, OM does not involve focusing attention on particular stimuli, but is a broad 
receptive awareness, an ‘open field capacity to detect arising sensory, feeling and thought events 
within an unrestricted ‘background’ of awareness, without a ‘grasping’ of these events in an 
explicitly selected foreground or focus’ (Raffone & Srinivasan, 2010, p.2). Such awareness is 
characterised by qualities including receptivity, clarity, stability/continuity, flexibility and non-
conceptual awareness (Brown et al., 2007). In this context, sati might be characterised as a form of 
OM. (That said, as Chiesa et al. (2011) point out, most mindfulness sessions begin with a period of 
FA, e.g., focusing on the breath. This is done to ‘stabilise’ one’s awareness for the more expansive 
phase of OM, in which one strives to simply be non-judgmentally present to one’s phenomenological 
experience.)  
Sati from a Buddhist perspective 
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From the perspective of our re-contextualising agenda here, another way to consider the question of 
the nature of sati is to ask, what are we mindful of? What types of phenomena are encompassed by 
our sphere of concern? From a Theravāda standpoint, we can address these questions through the 
fivefold niyāmas. Sati is arguably centred mainly on the first three niyāmas: utu, bija, and citta. In 
terms of utu-niyāma, one would be aware of causality operating in the physical world, appraised 
through paying attention to our own physicality, our physical surroundings, and to the consequences 
of actions (of ourselves and others) in this arena. A contemporary example might be the kind of 
watchful attention one would hope to maintain while driving a car. Secondly, with bija-niyāma 
(causality in the domain of organic matter), sati means being aware of our own organic nature, 
encompassing embodied sensations, including biological processes such as respiration) and how 
biological laws like aging affect our body. Secondarily, this niyāma encompasses mindfulness of 
nature (of the natural environment). Finally, the third level of conditionality is citta-niyāma, the ‘law 
of the mind’ (i.e., recurrent cognitive and phenomenological patterns), the significance of which is 
discussed immediately below.  
Therapeutic implications of sati 
Arguably, sati-mindfulness of the citta-niyāma is the predominant form of awareness promoted in 
Western approaches to mindfulness. Consider the proliferation of mindfulness-based interventions 
that have followed in the wake of Kabat-Zinn’s (1982) seminal MBSR programme, all of which teach 
people to be more aware of their cognitions and emotions, and to notice causal relationships among 
such phenomena. For instance, the most prominent adaptation of MBSR is mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy (MBCT), designed to prevent depressive relapse (Teasdale et al., 2000). Its 
theoretical premise is Teasdale’s (1988) ‘differential activation hypothesis,’ which holds that 
previously depressed people are susceptible to relapse due to ‘dysphoria-activated depressogenic 
thinking’ (Teasdale et al., 2000, p.615). For such people, negative emotions can potentially re-
activate negative thought patterns associated with previous depressive episodes, precipitating a 
downward spiral of negative thoughts and worsening affect, leading to relapse. In MBCT then, 
participants are helped to develop sati-mindfulness of thoughts and feelings, and of causal patterns 
among these (i.e., habitual thinking patterns). With this awareness, participants are then taught to 
‘decentre’ from these qualia – to regard these dispassionately with detached objectivity – rather 
than getting drawn into them. As Chambers et al. (2009, p.569) put it, MBCT involves ‘retraining 
awareness,’ enabling people to ‘more consciously choose... thoughts, emotions and sensations... 
rather than habitually reacting to them.’  
The type of sati-mindfulness encouraged by interventions such as MBSR and MBCT is very 
helpful. For instance, in randomised controlled trials, MBCT has been found to reduce relapse rates 
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for people with three or more previous episodes of depression (Ma & Teasdale, 2004), and as such 
has been approved by the UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (2004) as a treatment 
for recurrent depression. However, in the context of Buddhist philosophy and practice, the value of 
this kind of mindfulness alone is nevertheless limited, and one could argue that people might 
experience even greater benefits were they to engage with these Buddhist teachings. This could 
include trying to cultivate the other ‘forms’ of mindfulness featured here, namely appamada (with 
its emphasis on ethical awareness and practice) and sampajañña (with its emphasis on spiritual 
development). Of course, people practising sati-mindfulness may well be acting ethically and/or 
developing spiritually. However, as Stanley (2012) notes, while the Pāli canon preserved an ethical 
dimension to sati, when taken out of this context and conceptualised purely as an attention training 
technique, there is the risk of it becoming de-ethicised and de-spiritualised. Such de-ethicisation of 
mindfulness is unfortunate, for various reasons. For instance, ethical behaviour is not only desirable 
from a societal perspective (e.g., maintaining civic harmony), but from a Buddhist perspective, it 
benefits the actor too, as the next section explores. 
Appamada-mindfulness: Awareness suffused with an ethos of ethical care 
Introducing appamada 
While recognising the value of sati, this section raises the idea that people might benefit further 
from developing an appreciation of the importance of ethical behaviour. With this, we come to the 
second kind of mindfulness in the Pāli canon, appamada. It is worth clarifying that this should not be 
regarded as a separate type of mindfulness, distinct from sati; rather, it is a quality with which one 
might try to augment sati (Peacock, 2014). Thus, in speaking of appamada-mindfulness, really this 
means an enhanced form of awareness encompassing both sati and appamada. One way to discern 
the qualities that appamada brings to mindfulness is to consider the range of English translations for 
it, including earnestness (Müller, 1881), vigilant care (Soeng, 2006), unremitting alertness (Thera, 
1941), diligence (Peacock, 2014), and carefulness (Nikaya, 2008). Arguably the best translation is 
‘moral watchfulness’ (Rao, 2007, p.69); this reflects the commentary on the Dhammapada (suttas in 
the Khuddaka nikāya), which describes appamada as ‘awareness… with regard to the sphere of 
qualities of good conduct’ (The Old Commentary of the Dhammapada, p.431, cited in Carter, 2005, 
p.280). As such, we might regard appamada as awareness suffused with an ethos of ethical care. The 
significance of appamada is that it introduces an ethical dimension to mindfulness, taking it beyond 
simply awareness of what is happening (i.e., sati), and explicitly connecting it to Buddhist teachings 
on ethics and morality. Before considering such Buddhist teachings though, and the significance of 
appamada in Theravāda, it is worth contextualising the discussion by noting the way ethics are 
treated in Western psychology.  
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Appamada from a Western perspective 
In considering Western conceptualisations of ethics, it is first useful to clarify how they differ from 
conceptually related phenomena such as values and morals. Values do not necessarily concern right 
and wrong, but are ‘conceptions of the desirable’ that motivate behaviour and choices (Schwartz, 
1999, p.24). In contrast, morals do explicitly involve ‘notions of right and wrong’ (Hazard, 1994, 
p.451). However, the two are often closely connected, since shared values in a society frequently 
become the basis for a common moral framework. Ethics then relate to morals in the sense that, 
while the latter may be unarticulated or implicit, ethics is the explicit codification of such morals in a 
communally defined and recognised framework. However, it has been suggested that outside of 
specific contexts, many people tend not to be guided by an explicitly defined ethical code. Common 
exceptions to this are: abiding by the law of one’s country (Gawande, 2006); being affiliated to a 
profession that has a formal code (Mitchels & Bond, 2010); and following a religion (Pate & Bondi, 
1992). In these cases, people are able to avail themselves of guidance (even if imperfect and fallible) 
to help them ‘achieve the greatest good and minimise any potential wrongs’ (Mitchels & Bond, 2010, 
p.5). Outside these cases though, it could be argued that people have to struggle on their own to 
work out how to act in their own and others’ best interests.  
That is not to say such people are acting immorally. For instance, Kohlberg (1981) examined 
people’s responses to moral dilemmas, and found that people tend to develop through a standard 
sequences of phases. First, a ‘pre-conventional’ phase, where morality is determined hedonically, 
involving three stages: egocentric (what feels good); punishment/obedience (what gets 
rewarded/punished); and instrumental-relativist (what meets one’s needs). Second, a conventional’ 
phase, with morality determined by societal norms/laws, comprising interpersonal concordance 
(group approval), then law and order (upholding social order). Finally, a ‘post-conventional’ phase, in 
which right/wrong are determined by ‘higher’ principles, featuring two stages: social contract-
legalistic (general rights) and universal ethical-principle (universal rights). Although some critiques of 
the model have been aired – for instance, Gilligan (1977) suggested women tend to develop through 
the same stages in a different way from men, focusing on care rather than justice – the framework 
has been relatively well-validated over the years (Lapsley & Carlo, 2014). However, this article 
contends that people might benefit from an explicit ethical code that could accelerate their moral 
development. Moreover, the key point about appamada is not just that one has an ethical code, but 
keeps ethical considerations at the forefront of their awareness, and acts accordingly, as discussed 
next. 
Appamada from a Buddhist perspective 
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Like most religions, Buddhist literature is replete with teachings pertaining to morality, and with the 
codification of such teachings into explicit ethical guidelines and prescriptions. For a start, three 
aspects of the Noble Eightfold Path (see e.g., the Mahdcattdrisaka-sutta; MN III 71-78) – the 
Buddha’s central teaching about how to ameliorate and even escape suffering – are specifically 
concerned with morality (sīla): right speech (sammā-vācā), right action (sammā-kammanta), and 
right livelihood (sammā-ājīva). These three strands of the path are then elaborated upon in various 
sets of precepts, which elucidate in detail what right speech, action and livelihood consist of. The 
most widely known ethical framework in the Pāli Canon is the Pañca-sīla (‘Five precepts’), which 
encourage abstinence from pānātipātā (harming living beings), adinnadana (taking the not given), 
kamesu micchacara (misconduct concerning sense pleasures, e.g., sexual misconduct), musavada 
(false speech), and suramerayamajja pamadatthana (unmindful states related to consumption of 
alcohol or drugs). Sangharakshita (2003) points out that these precepts gain further strength if 
formulated positively, namely as exhortations to cultivate (respectively) mettā (loving-kindness), 
dana (generosity), appichatā (contentment), sacca (truthfulness) and sati (awareness). For instance, 
whereas refraining from harm is arguably a minimum expectation of civilised behaviour, mettā is a 
far stronger prosocial act, which actively incorporates love and care. This issue (of negative versus 
positive formulations) may be partly a function of the English language, and of the difficulty of 
finding discursive equivalents when translating terms from the original Pāli or Sanskrit. For example, 
a Pāli term such as avihimsā (non-harm), while being negatively formulated (vihimsā means 
harm/violence, with ‘a’ being a negative prefix), it nevertheless retains positive overtones 
(concerning love and care) which are not preserved if translated into English as non-harm. As such, 
Ostergaard (1977) argues that ‘love’ might be a more encompassing translation of avihimsā. 
For more committed Buddhists, these five precepts are supplemented by more extensive 
recommendations. For example, the Pāṭimokkha (Monastic Disciplinary Code) involves around two 
hundred rules (versions vary) for monastic life (Keown, 2009). More generally, Buddhist teachings 
feature exhortations to virtuous living. The Therevada tradition emphasises four brahma-viharas 
(‘divine abidings’): mettā (loving-kindness), karuṇā (compassion), muditā (sympathetic joy), and 
upekkha (equanimity). Similarly, the Mahayana tradition encourages practitioners to strive towards 
six pāramitā (perfections): dāna (generosity), sīla (morality), khanti (patience), viriya (perseverance), 
samādhi (concentration), and paññā (insight). In this light, we might say that appamada-mindfulness 
involves being aware of one’s actions in the light of these ethical guidelines, i.e., being mindful of the 
extent to which one’s actions are in accordance with these recommendations. Indeed, we might 
further say that while sati involves non-judgemental awareness of the present moment, appamada 
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re-introduces an element of judgement (crucially though, a compassionate form), since practitioners 
are encouraged to appraise the moral worth of their actions. 
Therapeutic implications of appamada 
In considering the ethical prescriptions above, it is vital to understand why these are recommended 
in Buddhism. While of course recognising the importance to society of ethical behaviour (in 
upholding civilizational norms), Buddhism makes the more profound (and persuasive) argument that 
ethical action also serves the wellbeing of the actor themselves. In essence, the contention is that 
skilful (i.e., ethical) actions generate future positive mental states, while unskilful (i.e., unethical) 
actions lead to future negative mental states. As such, whatever else the benefits (i.e., to other 
people) of ethical behaviour, this insight should help motivate the practitioner to move towards 
skilful action as far as possible. This insight rests on the teaching of paṭiccasamuppāda, and in 
particular on the fourth order of conditionality, the kamma niyāma, which is the application of the 
principle of causality with respect to ethics (Jones, 2012). Now, although the notion of kamma has 
entered Western discourse, it has often been misinterpreted. For instance, it is commonly taken to 
mean that everything that happens to a person is a result of their past actions. However, this is a 
misreading of the concept, at least from the perspective of Buddhaghosa. The nuance provided by 
his fivefold niyāmas is that events happen for all manner of reasons, some of which are caused by 
people’s past actions (kamma niyāma), and some of which are not (the other four niyāmas). At the 
same time though, Buddhaghosa still holds that every present action will nevertheless cause or 
contribute to an outcome in the future. 
Thus, appamada-mindfulness means becoming aware of kamma niyāma, i.e., appreciating 
that actions have consequences. This is not comparable to other religious teachings pertaining to 
ethics, such as the Christian notion of sin, which holds that one is punished for one’s misdeeds 
through divine retribution (Swinburne, 1989). Rather, the Buddhist notion of kamma does not 
necessarily involve a supernatural agency (although some teachers do interpret it that way), but 
rather proposes that we are rewarded or punished, in a causal sense, by our actions. As Kang (2009, 
p.73) explains it, ‘the law of karma [kamma] states that any volitional action rooted in non-greed, 
non-hatred and non-delusion (or in positive terms: generosity, love/compassion, and wisdom) gives 
rise to virtuous or positive imprints in the mind that would subsequently result in experiences of 
happiness and pleasure.’ Conversely, ‘any ethical action rooted in greed, hatred or delusion gives 
rise to their opposite non-virtuous/negative mental imprints that later result in experiences of 
suffering and displeasure.’ So, as noted above, Theravada holds that ethical actions do not only 
benefit the recipient, but the actor too; thus, people have a vested interest in acting ethically, and 
should be motivated to act as such. In Kang’s words, ‘a behavioural guideline that emerges from 
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such an ethical view of causality is that one ought to engage mindfully in positive karma rooted in 
positive volitions’ (p.73). Thus, appamada introduces a further dimension to mindfulness that is not 
present in sati alone: here the practitioner advances beyond simply being aware of their experience, 
but reflects and judges (compassionately) whether their actions are skilful (e.g., in accordance with 
the precepts). As such, as discussed in the conclusion, contemporary mindfulness interventions 
might benefit from introducing appamada into their teachings. 
Sampajañña: Awareness suffused with a sense of spiritual progress 
Introducing sampajañña 
This final section will suggest that our appreciation and development of mindfulness can be 
augmented even further: in addition to cultivating sati and appamada, one can aim to foster a 
spiritual aspect to one’s awareness, namely sampajañña, a third ‘form’ of mindfulness, which we 
might define as awareness suffused with a sense of spiritual progress. Again, as with appamada, this 
should not be regarded as a distinct ‘type’ of mindfulness, separate from the others, but a new 
quality or dimension that one can bring to mindfulness, thus creating an enriched compound of sati-
appamada-sampajañña mindfulness. 
So, what skills or qualities does sampajañña bring to mindfulness? Some scholars interpret 
this as the ability to ‘effortlessly’ sustain sati. For example, the 8th Century (C.E.) master Śāntideva 
(2002) states that ‘Samprajanya [sampajañña] comes and, once come, does not go again, if smṛti 
[sati] stands guard at the door of the mind’ (cited in Maharaj, 2013, p.67). Maharaj interprets this as 
meaning that the ‘assiduous practice of sati… culminates eventually in the achievement of 
samprajanya, which seems to be a more spontaneous and effortless state of watchfulness of the 
body and mind.’ Beyond this idea of ‘effortless’ mindfulness, many thinkers associate sampajañña 
specifically with insight. For instance, in the foundational Satipaṭṭhāna sutta (MN 10), there is a 
refrain of ātāpi sampajāno satimā, which Bodhi (2011) translates as ‘ardent, clearly comprehending, 
and mindful.’ Thus, Bodhi suggests that the phrase encompasses three mental factors: atapi (ardent) 
concerns the energy one needs to engage in practice; sati is watchful awareness; and sampajāno (an 
adjective relating to the noun sampajañña) pertains to clear comprehension. More specifically, 
Sangharakshita (2003) proposes that sampajañña means having insight or ‘clear comprehension’ of 
the possibility of spiritual development. Thus, Sangharakshita argues that it might best be translated 
as ‘mindfulness of purpose,’ in the sense that ‘everything we do should be done with a sense of the 
direction we want to move in and of whether or not our current action will take us in that direction’ 
(p.13). From this perspective, this kind of awareness supersedes appamada-mindfulness. Whereas 
appamada simply means appreciating the value of acting ethically – which could be done in a secular 
way (as indeed many people do) – sampajañña means recognising the possibility of psychospiritual 
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development, and pursuing this goal accordingly. This, arguably, is the fundamental ‘point’ of 
Buddhism: ultimately, all its teachings are focused on helping people overcome suffering and make 
progress towards spiritual liberation (however defined).  
Sampajañña from a Western perspective 
Before discussing Theravada perspectives on psychospiritual development, it is worth considering 
how spirituality is treated within Western psychology. In this, spirituality and spiritual development 
are both contested notions. Regarding spirituality, there are at least four main types of perspectives 
(Daniels, 2009): religious perspectives that invoke numinosity, e.g., the ‘quality of an individual 
whose inner life is oriented toward God, the supernatural, or the sacred’ (Yamane, 1998, p.492); 
psychological perspectives which aim to understand spirituality in terms of psychophysiological 
processes, such as Newberg’s (2010) neurotheological paradigm; humanistic/existential 
perspectives, which conceptualise spirituality in terms of developing deeper understanding of and 
connection with self and others, such as an ‘inner search for meaning and fulfilment’ (Graber, 2001, 
p.40); and the ecological perspective, which focuses on humanity’s connection to and responsibility 
towards the natural world (Kinsley, 1995).  
Given such diversity of perspectives, conceptualising spiritual development is perhaps even 
more problematic. Attempts have been made of course, e.g., by systematising scholars like Wilber 
(2007), who has sought to find commonalities across multiple structural-developmental schemas, 
including those pertaining to faith (Fowler, 1981) and ego-development (Cook-Greuter, 2004), and 
moral development (Kohlberg, 1981), together with non-Western sources such as Sri Aurobindo 
(1939-1940) and the Tibetan Book of the Dead (Evans-Wentz, 1960). In Wilber’s schematic, people 
progress through multiple quasi-independent developmental ‘lines’ (in the manner of Gardner’s 
(1999) multiple intelligences), from Kohlberg’s moral stages to Cook-Greuter’s ego-development 
progression. These lines all progress through the same broad phases identified by Kohlberg, i.e., pre-
conventional, conventional, and post-conventional (each of which are likewise differentiated into 
multiple stages). Regarding spiritual development specifically, this is positioned: (a) as a separate 
line in itself (concerning connection to the sacred), and (b) as the higher levels of all the other lines 
(e.g., high levels of moral development are regarded as inherently spiritual, as these involve ego 
transcendence through identification with increasingly wide spheres of existence). As innovative and 
promising as Wilber’s framework is though – and others like it, such as Spiral Dynamics (Beck & 
Cowan, 1996) – it must currently be regarded as somewhat speculative and untested (Bussey, 2010), 
even if many of the models within it were developed through empirical analysis. As such, for now, 
spiritual development is somewhat poorly understood and operationalised in Western psychology.  
Sampajañña from a Buddhist perspective 
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Turning to a Theravāda perspective, spiritual development, and particularly sampajañña 
mindfulness, can be understood by returning to the teaching of paṭiccasamuppādi. Sangharakshita 
(2003) proposes that sampajañña involves awareness of the final niyāma, the dhamma niyāma, 
which refers to the evolutionary potential of the universe to produce exemplary individuals such as 
the Buddha. From Sangharakshita’s perspective, the emergence and cultivation of sampajañña 
means that one would develop a deepening appreciation of the dhamma-niyāma, and its radical 
implications. One such implication is the transformative notion that all beings possess the potential 
of becoming a Buddha, and that the way to progress towards this is by following a spiritual path. Just 
as appamada entails appreciation of the value of living ethically, sampajañña means being 
convinced of the value and indeed necessity of diligently following such a path. This kind of 
awareness would inextricably inform one’s actions, such that one would evaluate and choose all 
one’s behaviours according to whether they facilitated progress along this path. One might argue 
that practitioners may have already embarked upon a spiritual path as soon as they have begun 
engaging with sati, and would certainly be making progress along this with the development of 
appamada. However, the emergence of sampajañña means a person would make their spiritual 
development a conscious, explicit and overriding priority in their life. As Buddhaghosa put it, while 
awareness of kamma niyāma shows us ‘why we should be good,’ insight into dhamma niyāma 
informs us why we should ‘try to better our good’ (Sv ii.432; cited in Jones, 2012, pp.548-549).  
 In considering the notion of spiritual development, there are numerous structural stage-wise 
schemas in Buddhist literature. Even just within the Tipiṭaka, Bucknell (1984) identifies six different 
lists of stages. However, rather than adumbrate these lists, we might just highlight one particular 
framework of spiritual progression, the one promulgated by Sangharakshita (2003) (since he is the 
prism through which we have viewed Theravāda in this paper). This is the Five Path schema, 
developed by the Sarvāstivāda school (circa 240 BCE), as interpreted by Sangharakshita. This 
conceptualises spiritual development in terms of four broad stages of deepening practice 
(integration, skilful intention, spiritual death, and spiritual rebirth), followed by a fifth goal state 
(enlightenment). Firstly, integration involves ‘cultivating ever-more skilful actions of body, speech 
and mind, so that progressively more satisfying, subtle, flexible, and open states of consciousness 
emerge as their fruit’  (Sangharakshita & Subhuti, 2013, p.128). One might say that this stage 
emerges once sati-mindfulness begins to evolve into appamada-mindfulness, as one starts to 
develop an emerging appreciation of the connection between one’s subjective experience (e.g., in 
mindfulness practice) and one’s actions in the world. Then, as appamada develops, a person might 
be seen as moving into the stage of skilful intention (sometimes referred to by Sangharakshita as the 
stage of ‘positive emotions’). This builds upon the first stage through ‘systematic cultivation of skilful 
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intentions and actions that bring the karmic fruit of a more finely tuned mind” (Sangharakshita & 
Subhuti, 2013, p.133), such as a more explicit commitment to ethical precepts (e.g., taking vows of 
ordination). As such, with the stage of skilful intention, practitioners could be said to be established 
on a spiritual path. At this point, we might suggest that appamada evolves into sampajañña-
mindfulness, in which there is a definite, conscious and dominant feeling of being on such a path.  
Subsequently, at some point along this path, the practitioner might enter the stage that 
Sangharakshita refers to as ‘spiritual death.’ This involves deepening insight into the nature of 
reality, and in particular, into what Buddhism refers to as the three lakshanas (‘marks of conditioned 
existence’): anicca (impermanence), anattā (insubstantiality), and dukkha (suffering). This central 
teaching suggests that all phenomena are empty of a fixed, enduring, independent nature, but 
instead are transitory (anicca) and interdependent (anattā). (The lakshanas are elucidated at 
numerous points in the Pāli canon, including SN 22.46, 35.1, AN 3.47, and Dhammapada 277-279.) It 
is the denial or ignorance of these fundamental truths, and the related attempt to attach to 
phenomena that are inherently subject to change, that is seen as causing suffering (dukkha). 
Spiritual death occurs when these insights are realised with respect to oneself, i.e., one understands 
the impermanence and insubstantiality of one’s being. Thus, ‘dying’ in this context means 
relinquishing one’s ‘self-oriented clinging’ (Sangharakshita & Subhuti, 2013, p.133). This does not 
involve nihilistic self-annihilation, but is rather the precursor to the final stage of spiritual rebirth, 
i.e., re-birth into a deeper sense of self, one that is coterminous with the dhamma niyāma, with the 
spiritual path itself. At this point, Sangharakshita and Subhuti suggest that one’s own egoic concerns 
dissipate, and one connects ‘more and more deeply with dhamma niyāma processes’ (p.134). At the 
culmination of this fourth stage, one could be said to enter into a fifth and final goal state, known in 
the Sarvāstivāda schema as the stage of ‘no more learning.’ Here, it is suggested that there is no 
longer a ‘self’ per se that is making progress, just the dhamma niyāma itself working through the 
medium of the person; this is the omega state of spiritual development, referred to in Buddhism as 
enlightenment.  
Therapeutic implications of sampajañña 
In considering the potential therapeutic implications of sampajañña, it appears to be potentially very 
valuable, and yet fraught with issues. In terms of possible benefits, there is much agreement that 
spirituality can be very valuable and important, both in academic psychological literature (Koenig, 
2009) and in ‘spiritual literature’ itself (Wilber, 2007). Positive outcomes associated with spirituality 
range from a sense of meaning in life (Graber, 2001) to interpersonal connectedness (Bellingham et 
al., 1989). Moreover, the notion of spiritual development, and the potential attainment of goal 
states such as ‘enlightenment,’ although conceptually opaque and poorly understood in a Western 
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psychological context, are frequently positioned within religious/spiritual literature as the most 
important and valuable endeavour a person can engage in (Sangharakshita, 2003). As such, if people 
learning (sati) mindfulness are minded to cultivate a sense of spiritualty through their practice, this is 
to be welcome and perhaps even assisted (in a clinical/therapeutic sense), as addressed below.  
However, there are caveats to this last sentence. For a start, the ‘if’ is important: many 
people are drawn to mindfulness in a secular way, and potentially find the notion of spirituality 
uncomfortable or at least unfamiliar (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). For instance, studying meditators in 
London, Lomas et al. (2013) found that many only initially took up mindfulness as a stress-
management technique; some were then perturbed to find it presented as including spiritual ideas 
and practices, and a few consequently disengaged from it as a result. As such, in whatever forum 
mindfulness is taught – from clinical/therapeutic settings to community groups – the notion of 
spirituality must be handled sensitively, with respect given to the divergent personal and cultural 
views people may hold regarding this (Gonsiorek et al., 2009).  
Then, even if people are minded to embark upon a journey of spiritual development, 
however conceived, they would well be advised to tread carefully upon this. Although the notion of 
spiritual development may be ostensibly appealing, it may yet be very challenging. For instance, 
while spiritual ‘death’ and ‘rebirth’ may ultimately be liberating processes, they involve radically 
challenging one’s sense of self, which can be a difficult process to navigate, especially if people lack 
appropriate guidance (Lomas et al., 2015). Indeed, a study by Shapiro (1992) of long-term Vipassana 
meditators (who might reasonably be regarded as being on a ‘spiritual path’) found that 62% had 
experienced psychological problems relating to their practice (e.g., depression and anxiety), with 7% 
describing more profound issues (e.g., depersonalization). Similarly, Lustyk et al. (2009) reviewed 
mental health problems connected to meditation, and identified 17 relevant primary publications, 
the majority of which were case studies of problems like psychosis occurring after intensive retreats. 
For this reason, meditation has tended to be contraindicated for particular clinical groups, such as 
those with a history of schizophrenia (Dobkin et al., 2012) (although exceptions to this are emerging; 
e.g., Chadwick et al., 2005). It should be emphasised that most original Buddhist literature explicitly 
acknowledges that spiritual development is likely to be challenging, with incumbent psychological 
risks (Engler, 2003). Indeed, these teachings are designed to address and guide seekers through such 
challenges, while part of the role of sanghas (religious communities) is to likewise help contextualise 
and support practitioners through such challenges. As such, the idea of spiritual development must 
be handled sensitively in a clinical or therapeutic context, as elucidated in the final section.  
Conclusion 
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This paper has argued that current conceptualisations and utilisations of mindfulness in the West, 
such as clinical/therapeutic mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs), tend to focus mainly on sati-
type mindfulness. However, as valuable as such interventions are, it has been suggested the West 
may benefit from engaging with the ethical and spiritual dimensions of mindfulness found in the 
‘original’ Buddhist teachings (recognising that Buddhism comprises diverse schools of thought). 
Indeed, Van Gordon et al. (2015b) have suggested that we are beginning to see the emergence of 
‘second generation’ MBIs, which do explore the ethical and spiritual dimensions of Buddhism. A 
pioneering early example of such exploration is perhaps Linehan’s (1993) Dialectical Behavior 
Therapy, which has successfully integrated cognitive-behavioural strategies with Zen Buddhist 
principles and mindfulness practice in the treatment of borderline personality disorder (Robins, 
2002). So, in the interest of contributing towards this second generation of MBIs, this paper finishes 
with some observations based on the discussion above, dealing in turn with the idea of bringing an 
ethical and spiritual dimension to MBIs. 
First, introducing an ethical dimension to MBIs would be potentially very worthwhile. Most 
MBIs – founded as they are on the concept of sati – generally do not involve any explicit ethical 
considerations. If participants are experiencing negative thoughts or feelings, they are encouraged 
to attend to these and to decentre from them. This is an effective mental response of course, hence 
the positive impact such interventions have upon wellbeing (Ma & Teasdale, 2004). However, what 
these interventions do not do is make causal links between such negative qualia and people’s 
actions outside the meditation session. This is an unfortunate omission, since from a Buddhist 
perspective, a prophylactic solution to distress would be to help people learn to live skilfully (i.e., 
ethically), thus lessening the likelihood of these negative qualia emerging in the first place. As such, 
it could be argued that such interventions would be even more powerful if, in addition to teaching 
sati-mindfulness of the present moment, they also encouraged appamada-mindfulness of the 
ethical dimension of one’s actions. 
 So, what would introducing appamada look like in practice? There are already meditation-
based interventions promoting prosocial qualities such as loving-kindness (Fredrickson et al., 2008). 
Moreover, most MBIs encourage practitioners to imbue their awareness with positive attitudinal 
qualities like compassion (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Indeed, Baer (2015) argues that the promotion of such 
qualities means that first generation MBIs are already helping to inculcate beneficial ethical values. 
However, there is arguably room for a more systematic empirical and theoretical enquiry into the 
value of acting ethically, and for efforts to explicitly promote ethical awareness and action in the 
context of MBIs. For a start, this could involve integrating an ethical element into existing MBIs (e.g., 
MBSR). For instance, participants’ attention could be drawn to the way that actions and events in 
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their lives tend to affect the kinds of experiences they have in meditation. This could then be the 
platform for introducing a segment into one of the sessions, in which the notion of ‘skilful’ behaviour 
is introduced, together with the idea of following an ethical framework (as a guide to skilfulness). 
Here, the five Buddhist precepts could be highlighted as an example of such a framework, although 
it might be emphasised that one would not need to be a Buddhist to follow these. Participants could 
then unobtrusively be invited to engage with the precepts, and to explore the impact that doing so 
had upon their meditation practice and overall wellbeing.  
There is also the possibility of developing new MBIs specifically focused on ethics. For 
instance, the author is currently developing an eight-week intervention, modelled on MBSR, entitled 
Mindfulness-Based Ethical Living: the first session introduces mindfulness; the second session 
presents the five precepts, and explains their relevance to wellbeing; the next five sessions focus on 
each of the precepts in turn (one per week); and the final session draws all the strands together. 
Each session includes mindfulness practice, including reflection on ethics themselves, and as per 
MBSR, participants are also encouraged to undertake homework exercises (e.g., being mindful of 
their behaviour in relation to the precept focused on that week). Here it is also emphasised that one 
does not have to be Buddhist or spiritual to participate; participants are simply invited to explore the 
impact that following the precepts has upon wellbeing. It is also important to avoid any implication 
of judgement and guilt, which can be very unhelpful in a therapeutic context (Brazier, 2009); the 
point is not to chastise people for acting ‘unskilfully,’ but simply to encourage them to notice any 
positive effects when they do manage to act well. 
The idea of introducing a spiritual dimension to MBIs is potentially more problematic. As 
discussed above, spirituality can be a contentious notion for some people (Lomas et al., 2013), and 
one should be wary about foisting it upon people in the context of secularised MBIs such as MBSR. 
Alternatively, participants may already be on a different spiritual path, and may likewise resent 
efforts to ‘convert’ them to Buddhism; indeed, the Dalai Lama has suggested it is preferable for 
people to stay with the religious tradition in which they are raised than to ‘switch’ paths (Batchelor, 
1999). That said, it may still be appropriate in secular MBIs to gently mention that mindfulness is 
based upon a rich tradition of Buddhist spiritual practice, and to provide interested participants with 
information regarding resources (e.g., local Buddhist groups) that they can engage with if curious. 
For instance, while Lomas et al. (2013) found that many meditators had only taken up the practice 
initially as a means of stress reduction (e.g., through an MBSR course), a majority of these had 
subsequently become interested in exploring the wider Buddhist context of meditation, and had 
since embarked upon a spiritual path (Lomas et al., 2014).  
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In terms of more in-depth journeys of spiritual development, this is arguably not the kind of 
process that can be supported by time-limited clinical/therapeutic interventions, but requires either 
a long-term psychotherapeutic relationship (Miller, 1999), or involvement with an established 
spiritual tradition and community (Engler, 2003). It is perhaps only in such contexts that the type of 
psychological challenges mentioned above can be contextualised, supported, and safely worked 
through. This of course is not an argument against imbuing mindfulness with a spiritual dimension – 
far from it – but simply a recognition that any such journey is often complicated and hard, and 
usually requires the kind of on-going guidance and nurturance that only skilled therapists and/or 
established spiritual communities can provide. 
Summary 
This paper has suggested that mindfulness in the West, particularly in academic and clinical settings, 
has largely become de-contextualised from its Buddhist origins. This has meant that mindfulness has 
to an extent been denuded of its power as a means of psychospiritual development. Thus, the paper 
has argued for the value of re-contextualising mindfulness, and has offered one such way of doing 
so. Drawing on Theravada Buddhism, it proposed that Buddhism identifies three main ‘forms’ of 
mindfulness: sati (awareness of the present moment), appamada (awareness suffused with ethical 
care), and sampajañña (awareness suffused with a sense of spiritual development). Currently, only 
sati has really been recognised in the West. However, we have much to gain from also recognising 
the potential ethical and spiritual dimensions of mindfulness, and from encouraging appamada and 
sampajañña mindfulness. Recommendations were made for how to foster ethical awareness in 
clinical/therapeutic practice. However, introducing spiritual awareness is potentially more 
problematic, and is perhaps only appropriate in the context of long-term therapeutic relationships or 
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